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instead of sticking with "without creation" when the former clearly
involves a temporal sequence between eternity and time. I take all this as
evidence that my reconstruction may not be Craig's view and that what he
has in mind is closer to the what he admits is incoherent, that God existed
timelessly before time but then entered time and became temporal. If so,
does he just want to have it both ways?
Real Ethics: Rethinking the Foundations of Morality, by Jol1n M. Rist.
Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. viii, 295. $65.00 (cloth); $23.00
(paper).
PAUL COPAN, Palm Beach Atlantic University
John M. Rist, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy and Classics at the
University of Toronto, has written a superb book on ethics-a "developed
and Christianized system of Platonic realism" (139). It is insightful and
wise, honest and penetrating, thought-provoking and practical. Rist dis-
plays all the marks of a seasoned philosopher, and the reader will not be
disappointed (unless, perhaps, he is a naturalist). Indeed, the book is pro-
foundly critical of all attempts at naturalistic ethics.
Rist sets forth a synopsis of ethical views spanning the history of philos-
ophy with lucid analysis, making for an excellent textbook in ethics-espe-
cially in a day when the transcendent basis for ethics tends to be ignored or
downplayed.
Rist pulls no punches. From beginning to end, he excoriates attempts at
naturalistic moral realism-with all its talk of "rights" and "freedom"-as
the "ethical hangover from a more homogeneous Christian past" (2).
Arglling for a personalized or modified Platonism (along the lines of
Augustine), he leaves us with the only two available alternatives morally
and politically-"Platonism or deception" (283). If Plato and his philo-
sophical successors were radically mistaken, then the world is far stranger
(i.e., unintelligible) and more dreadful than we could conceive.
In his introduction, he speaks to the contemporary "crisis" in the West
about the foundations of ethics, in which it is "widely believed" that tran-
scendental realism is dead or dying and that we must resort to human
choice to "construct" values. The present chaos in ethics is largely due to
the influence of Nietzsche, and ethics is fast moving in the direction of per-
spectivism, constructivism, and relativism. For Plato, the key question
was, "How should I live?" Philosophical truth is a way of life and is not
reducible to any set of propositions (7), and Rist proposes that we look to
Plato and his ilk to build on the important philosophical foundation they
have laid to guide our discussion in the present.
In chapter 1 ("Moral Nihilism: Socrates vs. Thrasymachus"), Rist begins
with Plato's Republic and the Thrasymachean discussion of justice as "the
advantage of the stronger." By this view, no objective values exist, and we
construct which values we want. If there are no objective moral truths,
then Thrasymachus is right. Plato presents us with only two choices-
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moral nihilism or moral transcendentalism. Plato sees the former as a seri-
ous social threat. The Platonic (Socratic) challenge is critical: "unless some
sort of transcendental theory of moral values can be defended, it is impos-
sible to identify or adequately to motivate and justify the pursuit of the
good life" (25).
Chapter 2 ("Morals and Metaphysics") points out that Plato's "comple-
mentary strategy" for defeating Thrasymachus is to show that "a certain
metaphysics, together with a very specific theory of man, are necessary
foundations for morality" (30). Further, "metaphysical enquiry" is ulti-
mately inseparable from "moral enquiry" (32). Under Thrasymachus'
might-makes-right scheme, there is no ground for obligation except (mini-
mally) self-defense. But for Plato, the Forms both inspire and provide the
standard by which we must live our lives each day. In the end, if transcen-
dental realism fails, "Thrasymachus wins" (37).
Rist roots his ethic specifically in theism (following Augustine, the "first
Christian Platonist"), in which goodness and justice "subsist in God's
being or nature" (38) rather than being free-floating. Thus, unlike Plato,
Augustine can sensibly speak of loving the Good precisely because the
Good is a personal Being. Toward the end of the chapter, Rist reviews the
ethic of Epicurus (in which friendship is impossible since it is merely
instrumental), Machiavelli (in which one chooses political glory over the
love of God), and Hobbes (who brings the two together).
Chapter 3 ("The Soul and the Self") speaks very frankly about the divid-
edness of the self (reflected in doubt, self-deception, living out different
roles or "wearing many hats," conflict between will and passions, not truly
knowing ourselves) and notes that if our lives are to be morally meaningful,
we must take possession of (and not merely construct) our telos. Indeed, our
soul's faculties are damaged or malaligned, which, according to Christian
theism, will be put to right in the eschaton (82). Rist's comments on the
dividedness of the self-he later speaks on the necessity of continuing per-
sonal identity to make sense of moral agency-are insightful both phenom-
enologically and practically. Indeed, as we become more evil, we become
the more multiple (75). Along the lines of John Hare's book The Moral Gap,
Rist recognizes that grace or outside assistance is necessary for the improve-
ment and unification of self; this does not come through self-effort.
Chapter 4 ("Division and Its Remedies") further emphasizes the meeting
of our need (lack of unity) must come from without: "without outside moral
or spiritual influences we shall not develop well" (96). Thus, individualism
(including libertarian schemes such as Nozick's) is doomed to failure. Even
seeking unity through human relationships will not ultimately succeed
since we disappoint-and even disillusion-one another. But "God's love
would not be thus unreliable" (99). Rist effectively shows that if there is no
God who can one day restore our divided self (as Augustine maintained),
then the united self is "a delusion, a mere projection" (100). Integration can
come only through "an external force: the love and grace of God" (105).
Plato's love of the Good offered no reciprocity whereas Augustinian theism
does: not only can we love God, but He turns to us in love and friendship.
Rist concludes with some reflections on the failure of politics without a
metaphysical grounding: "my present question is whether any society ...
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can of itself provide norrns for our own best development, and how we can
distinguish how the norrns of any one society are better than those of any
other"-unless "we have some external criteria" (113).
In chapter 5 ("Rules and Applications"), Rist considers some practicali-
ties that other ethics books often overlook. The first deals with rules:
although they are "primitives" in a metaphysical universe, their proper
status can be obscured by the abuses of legalism and hypocrisy. Rule-obei-
sance, which tends to reflect little self-knowledge, can often override com-
passion and stifte humor. Impersonal rules become more important than
persons. Rist rightly points out that "impersonal justice" is not truly jus-
tice. Indeed, rules need a context to make sense of them (122), and this must
be commLlnicated in order to educate others ethically. True moral feelings
are necessary for a well-integrated character. Thus, rules are means to
ends, but they are still important.
The second problem is "dirty hands": what if an act intended for good
increases division in the self and has many unintended negative conse-
quences? To help us wade through these difficulties, an adequate context
is available only to the realist who believes in a providential God (134).
Mere rule-following, on the other hand, may lead to further injustice; there
is more to justice than impartiality. The problem with Kant's approach is
that agents themselves are not impersonal, and the targets of moral actions
are not impersonal. Fairness in individual cases is subordinate to broader
principles of justice, but both are subordinate to love.
Chapter 6 is a delicious one ("The Past, Present and Future of Practical
Reasoning"), picking apart S. Darwall, A. Gibbard, and P. Railton for their
alleged "fin de siecle" assessment of the moral debate in favor of naturalistic
alternatives. They show "no acquaintance with anything contemporary not
written in English" and assume that all worthy moral debate can be
abstracted from time and place. Further, they make no reference to theistic
moral theory or naturallaw theory, nor do they mention Nietzsche-which
thickens the "air of umeality which the historical parochialism of their arti-
cle insistently exhales" (141-2). The problem with the likes of Kant and
Aristotle (not to mention the above thinkers) is that they separate ethics
from metaphysics. But for Aquinas, naturallaw depends on eternallaw. If
there is a God, then we shall order our lives much differently than if no God
exists. In naturalism, all we have is a prudential"ought." The chapter ends
with an excellent discussion and rebuttal of Hume (whose ethic is wrong-
headed) and Kant (whose ethic is woefully inadequate and incomplete,
though borrowing "the image of God" from his Protestant tradition).
Chapter 7 ("Autonomy and Choice") exposes the hollowness of rights-
talk and "choice" without a "metaphysical foundation" (179), yielding
legal rights only and not natural rights. The notion of a "contract" (or the
"veil of ignorance," which ironically disallows the very experience required
to make moral and rational determinations) succumbs to an ethic of choice
as ultimate. But choice needs a context to deterrnine the rightness of what
is chosen. Given a choice-ethic, moral dilemmas do not exist (194). (And,
contra D. Parfit, if personal identity does not continue over time, then why
should I, say, keep my marriage vows since I was a different person back
then than I am now?)
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Chapter 8 ("Ethics and Ideology") diseusses man in community rather
than as an individual; it is full of wise social and political counsel.
Contrary to the liberal notion, we are communal beings-a vanishing idea
in today's Western society. Community is necessary for individual
growth. But if the individual is ultimate, then Gauguin could not be fault-
ed for abandoning his family and heading for Tahiti. By seeking freedom,
we rarely see the need to correct our behavior or perspective or to extend
our area of responsibility. Society will always be a means to my own ends.
But if the self needs correcting (just talk to your spouse!), then it needs
community to move beyond what it is now. Astate is wise if it encourages
h.olding back on rights-seeking and encourages community-as well as
preserving a sense of the past. (The more we uncritically trash the West,
the more ahistorical-and vulnerable to revisionist history-we become.)
But ultimately, deception will have to rule (given naturalism) to hold a
society of autonomous selves together.
The final chapter ("Ethics and God") reviews the need for God as the
metaphysical foundation for ethics, grounding human dignity and the
human telos as well as graciously providing assistance in view of our moral
failures and our divided selves. We cannot separate God's power from His
love (mere might does not make right). The chapter closes with some wise
nuggets about "dirty hands" and the place of politics (although I would
disagree with Rist's assessment of capital punishment).
This book deserves to be widely read. I wish it much success as an
important antidote to the misguided notion that goodness can be detached
fromGod.
Powers and Submissions by Sarah Coakley. Oxford, UK: Blackwell
Publishers, 2002. Pp. xx, 172. $66.95 (hardcover), $28.95 (paperback).
PATRICIA ALTENBERND JOHNSON, University of Dayton
Power and Submissions reorganizes and edits aseries of essays written by
Sarah Coakley during the 1990s. The book makes her work accessible to
readers in the United States and also proposes to reinterpret the individual
essays in order to connect them into a coherent project. The book begins
with a Prologue that is followed by th.ree sections: rrhe Contemplative
Matrix, Philosophical Interlocutions, and Doctrinal Implications.
In the Prologue, Coakley acknowledges that part of her motivation for
this book is to provide students with one place where many of her signifi-
cant essays can be found. In addition, she proposes to establish a foeus for
the essays that have been written over the decade. She contends that
throughout the decade, she has been asking how "the caH for liberation of
the powerless and oppressed, especiaHy of women, [can] possibly coexist
with a revalorization of any form of 'submission' - divine or otherwise"
(xv). She suggests that the heart of the essays contained in this book is the
different meanings of "power" and "submission" and the false choice
betweel1. vulnerability and liberative choice. She proposes to "reinvent the
